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Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics contains seventeen new essays which 
explore idealism, a family of views according to which the mental has 
priority over the material. Given the recent history of philosophy, it is 
difficult not to see the volume’s publication as the harbinger of a turning 
tide. Despite the prominence of idealist thought in the nineteenth century, 
relatively few in the twentieth held that the mental has priority over the 
material in any substantial way. Even fewer defended the radical view, 
most commonly associated with George Berkeley, that we are fundamen-
tally immaterial substances whose experiences map harmoniously into 
a divinely coordinated dream-world. Instead, most tried to squeeze the 
mental into a more or at least equally basic material realm. And the serious 
difficulties resulting from these efforts led few to question whether ideal-
ists such as Berkeley might have been right after all. In fact, theorists have 
mostly neglected idealism even as a target worthy of careful criticism.
Editors Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce say that the volume 
“aims to correct the unjustified neglect of idealism” (ix). On this score, 
the volume certainly succeeds. And, as a result, we all stand to benefit, no 
matter where we fall on the philosophical spectrum. To examine idealism 
carefully, one must engage fundamental questions in philosophy which 
help carve theoretical space into grand metaphysical systems. This is, at 
least for me, philosophy at its most enjoyable. How we judge idealism’s 
case can also reveal deeper methodological commitments about theory 
choice and uncover how comfortable we are with explanatory lacunae in 
these places rather than those. Every essay in the volume lures the reader 
into grand systematic theorizing and methodological soul-searching, even 
those essays whose arguments may be less than compelling.
Overall, the essays are strong. And many of them concern questions typ-
ically treated in the philosophy of religion. Daniel Greco’s “Explanation, 
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Idealism, and Design” and Jacob Ross’s “Idealism and Fine-Tuning” focus 
on connections between design and fine-tuning, on the one hand, and 
idealism, on the other. I enjoyed Kris McDaniel’s essay, “The Idealism of 
Mary Whiton Calkins.” Calkins, the first woman president of the Ameri-
can Philosophical Association, developed a version of absolute idealism 
according to which the Absolute is personal. Without McDaniel’s essay, I 
would have remained unaware of her contributions.
Two more essays focus on versions of idealism within major religious 
traditions. Samuel Lebens’s “Hassidic Idealism” concerns the Kabbalistic 
doctrine of the sefirot, which have been described as both divine ener-
gies and as hypostasized divine attributes. This beautifully written essay 
attempts to square the sefirot with monotheism by carefully applying 
insights from the philosophy of language gained by reflection on fic-
tional discourse. The essay should appeal to many beyond its intended 
audience, those with interests in either medieval Kabbalah or Trinitar-
ian doctrine. Two groups of scholars come to mind. First, the growing 
number interested in St. Gregory Palamas and the panentheism which 
arguably arises from the essence-energies distinction. (Lebens also briefly 
notes this connection on 175n118.) And, second, those with interests in the 
early-twentieth-century Russian Orthodox Sophiologists such as Sergei 
Bulgakov and Pavel Florensky, whose accounts personify divine wisdom 
without, in their view, expanding the Godhead from three hypostases to 
four. (See, for example, Sergei Bulgakov, Sophia, the Wisdom of God: An 
Outline of Sophiology [Lindisfarne Press, 1993] and Pavel Florensky, The 
Pillar and Ground of the Truth [Princeton University Press, 1997; originally 
published in 1914].)
Bronwyn Finnigan’s “Buddhist Idealism” articulates important argu-
ments from Buddhist and Indian philosophy. Though they span as far 
back as the fourth century, some bear a striking resemblance to arguments 
found much later in Berkeley and elsewhere. Finnigan has provided a 
great service to those of us who, like me, were largely unaware of these 
connections.
A handful of essays discuss aspects of Berkeleyan idealism. The open-
ing essay, “Parrying Parity” by Todd Buras and Trent Dougherty, usefully 
draws attention to Robert Merrihew Adams’s “Idealism Vindicated” (in 
Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, eds, Persons: Human and Divine 
[Oxford University Press Oxford, 2007], 35–54) and facilitates a deeper un-
derstanding of Adams’s arguments. Graham Oppy’s “Against Idealism” 
argues (unsuccessfully, in my view) that idealism is less preferable to nat-
uralism because it is less theoretically virtuous. And three more essays in 
some way bear on the truth of Berkeleyan idealism. These arguments ap-
pear in the stellar contributions by Robert Smithson, Tyron Goldschmidt 
and Aaron Segal, and Helen Yetter-Chappell. In what follows, I engage 
more closely with each of these essays.
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Smithson’s “A New Epistemic Argument for Idealism” argues for ideal-
ism on the basis of linguistic practice. The argument hinges on the follow-
ing scenario:
Suppose we travel to the all-knowing, perfectly trustworthy Oracle to settle 
once and for all whether there is an external world of material objects. There, 
we receive a disheartening report: our experiences are caused not by mate-
rial objects, but rather by a malicious demon intent on deceiving us. This 
testimony would surprise and dismay us. We might say things like “Apples 
and books don’t really exist!” and “We don’t have bodies after all!” But this 
immediate shock would pass. And after several minutes, we would go back 
to saying things like “There is an apple in the kitchen” or “I’m walking to 
the bus stop” just as we always had. This is because we would have to return 
to the ordinary concerns of human life: buying groceries, taking the bus to 
work, and so on. (21)
I find Smithson’s treatment of our likely behavior in an Oracle scenario 
plausible. That behavior includes both an apparent retraction of our ordi-
nary object judgments and then an apparent return to making those same 
judgments. Smithson builds his case for idealism on the apparent return 
to our ordinary judgments.
Suppose we have apple experiences in my kitchen and say “there’s an 
apple in the kitchen’’ both before and after the Oracle breaks the news that no 
mind-independent object lies “behind’’ our apple experiences. Smithson’s 
argument hinges on two claims: (i) that our post-Oracle judgment is true, 
and (ii) the pre- and post-Oracle judgments have the same content. If the 
post-Oracle judgment is true, that judgment cannot have the content that 
a mind-independent apple is in the kitchen. So if the pre- and post-Oracle 
judgments have the same content, the pre-Oracle judgment cannot have the 
content that a mind-independent apple is in the kitchen either. Smithson 
concludes that truths about objects supervene on actual and counterfactual 
experiences and not on whether there are mind-independent objects behind 
those experiences.
However, I suspect many think of apples and other ordinary objects 
as being mind-independent not only in some theoretical sense but also 
within the confines of everyday judgments about those objects. And so 
I suspect that for many, the pre-and post-Oracle judgments would have 
slightly different contents even though speakers would continue to use 
the same English sentences to express those judgments. In other words, 
I see the apparent retraction in the Oracle scenario as a real retraction. 
But, out of pragmatic necessity, speakers would continue to utter the same 
English sentences.
Consider it this way: in the Oracle case, what would have been evi-
dence for the view that the truth of our ordinary judgments supervenes 
on truths about the mind-independence of those objects? On the assump-
tion that our ordinary judgments about apples concerned apples-as-
mind-independent-objects, we wouldn’t expect post-Oracle that folks 
would adopt a new terminology to express ordinary object judgments. 
Faith and Philosophy268
Most likely, folks would use the same terms to express slightly different 
judgments. Since we would expect folks to continue to talk the same way 
whether or not ordinary judgments previously concerned objects thought 
to be mind-independent, the continued use of ordinary object expressions 
wouldn’t serve as evidence against the view that ordinary judgments pre-
viously concerned objects thought to be mind-independent. Smithson’s 
argument clearly connects with Berkeley’s claims that idealism doesn’t 
conflict with common sense. And although I have deep sympathies with 
both Berkeley and Smithson overall, I demur on this point. Smithson, of 
course, has much more to say (Robert Smithson, “Edenic Idealism” [un-
published manuscript]).
Goldschmidt and Segal’s essay contains a new argument for idealism 
and then another new argument for the view that idealism is necessar-
ily true if true at all. The new argument for idealism begins with three 
views: idealism, impurism (under which falls traditional dualism), and 
materialism. They present the Mary and Zombie arguments against ma-
terialism and the causal exclusion argument against impurism (and dual-
ism). Idealism then remains the only view standing. Repurposing these 
well-known arguments for idealism is clever and interesting. But I worry 
that the weaknesses of the smaller arguments combine to infect the overall 
argument.
For example, consider the Zombie argument, which attempts to show 
that the possibility of a zombie, a non-conscious physical duplicate of a 
conscious being like you, follows from the conceivability of such a zombie. 
Before the Zombie argument had been formulated, no physicalist should 
have posited a conceptual connection between the physical stuff that sup-
posedly accounts for consciousness and consciousness itself. By positing 
a metaphysical but not a conceptual connection between the material and 
the mental, physicalists should have expected that even a godlike con-
ceiver could have conceived of the physical stuff without the accompany-
ing mental stuff. Consequently, the Zombie argument should have always 
been deemed unsuccessful. Though I don’t have the space here to review 
the other arguments, I should say that I am slightly less pessimistic about 
the causal exclusion argument and even occasionally optimistic about the 
Mary argument. But the cumulative effect of linking these arguments to-
gether seems to me to result in an argument considerably weaker than its 
strongest link.
At any rate, I want to focus on Goldschmidt and Segal’s original argu-
ment that idealism is, if true, also necessarily true. Here is one version of 
their argument:
The authors of this essay, despite sharing much in common, are also dif-
ferent in many respects. Thus there is some feature that Aaron has that Ty 
lacks. Call it Bob. We can give the following argument: if idealism is true . . . 
then Bob is a mental feature, since Aaron is concrete, and yet he has Bob. 
But so too is Bob’s negation. For Ty is concrete, and yet has Bob’s negation. 
Now, necessarily everything has either Bob or Bob’s negation. Since both 
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are mental features, and hence necessarily are mental features, necessarily 
everything is a mental thing. So then any feature whatsoever entails being 
a mental thing, and so any feature whatsoever is a mental feature. If that’s 
true, then necessarily, everything has only mental features. So: if idealism is 
true, then necessarily, everything is purely mental. (46)
Now suppose that Bob is the feature of being happy. So Ty “has Bob’s 
negation,’’ the property of being non-happy. Is it so clear that being non-
happy is a “mental feature”? A negative property such as being non-
happy is a determinable, if it exists at all. And the possible ways of being 
non-happy are its possible determinates. The determinates surely include 
mental ways of being non-happy, such as being sad or grumpy. But who-
ever grants that idealism’s truth doesn’t guarantee its necessity would also 
say that, possibly, there are non-mental ways of being non-happy, such 
as being mind-independently spherical, being mind-independently two 
meters long, or simply being mind-independent. If idealism is true and 
everything is mental, then something’s being non-happy materially implies 
both that whatever is non-happy is a mental thing and that any exempli-
fied determinate of non-happiness is also a mental feature. But if there are 
possible non-mental determinates of being non-happy, then something’s 
being non-happy entails neither that whatever is non-happy is a mental 
thing nor that any exemplified determinate of non-happiness is a mental 
feature. The argument seems to assume that all possible properties are 
actual (or perhaps actually exemplified). But that is precisely the assump-
tion to deny if one thinks that, even if idealism were true, some non-actual 
(or non-exemplified), non-mental features would be possible. Although 
the argument’s conclusion seems true to me, the argument itself doesn’t 
seem entirely successful.
Helen Yetter-Chappell’s thought-provoking essay explores whether a 
non-theistic version of idealism can match Berkeley’s theistic version in 
explanatory power. In Berkeley’s system, God explains both (i) the contin-
ued existence of objects unperceived by finite minds and (ii) the regular-
ity of our perceptual lives. Yetter-Chappell sketches a non-theistic sort of 
Berkeleyan idealism and then examines whether it explains (i) and (ii). 
Yetter-Chappell’s non-theistic idealism identifies reality with a phenom-
enal unity of consciousness that binds together all possible perceptions 
from every spatial perspective. She writes:
External reality is a vast unity of consciousness, independent from all finite 
minds. This unity is vastly more complex than the unities we’re directly ac-
quainted with. Consider my cup. The cup exists independently of any (fi-
nite) minds insofar as it is a part of this vast phenomenal unity. But what’s 
included in the phenomenal unity isn’t merely the sensations I have when 
perceiving the cup from a particular vantage point. The unity must include 
the experience of the cup from every possible perspective it could be viewed 
from, binding together the experience of the cup from every possible angle 
and also from every possible sort of perceiver (humans, bugs, bats, color-
inverts, etc.). (68)
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This picture of the phenomenal unity, what Yetter-Chappell calls the 
“phenomenal tapestry,’’ contains more details than I can cover here. But 
the general idea is that if external objects are nothing more than bundles 
of perceptions, and reality consists of nothing more than a vast unity of 
consciousness which includes every possible perception of every actual 
thing, we can explain why objects exist even when no actual finite mind 
perceives them. The objects exist because the perceptions in the tapes-
try which constitute them exist. Yetter-Chappell then neatly appeals to 
an idealist interpretation of the laws of physics to explain the tapestry’s 
particular regularity. If the phenomenal tapestry is not itself a mind, then 
perhaps idealism doesn’t need Berkeley’s God to undergird the world’s 
stability and regularity. But if the tapestry is a mind in a robust sense, have 
we really shown that we can excise a divine mind from Berkeley’s system? 
The project’s success, then, depends on what minds are and whether the 
tapestry counts as one.
Yetter-Chappell says she prefers “a Humean bundle conception of the 
mind.” And “given such a conception, the tapestry is not a mind in any 
robust sense, over and above being a phenomenal unity” (70). Now if the 
tapestry is a truly Humean bundle of perceptions, no substance underlies 
the perceptions and no perception in the bundle necessitates any other. 
What results is a version of atheistic Humeanism, an unstable position, 
whether it involves idealism or not.
The combination of atheism and Humeanism is quite popular in meta-
physical circles. But it offers a terribly unsatisfying explanation for our 
world’s regularity. On Humean idealism with a Yetter-Chappellian tap-
estry, modal space would contain, at the very least, possible tapestries 
consisting of every possible recombination of perceptions. This modal 
space would obey a modal version of Murphy’s law, with a point in 
modal space for every possible non-regular and chaotic combination of 
perceptions. Since, for every way of being regular, there are very many 
ways of being irregular, the space of regular worlds is something like a 
bullseye compared to the rest of the space of irregular worlds. Regular-
ity is quite unlikely given atheistic Humeanism. But regularity is quite 
likely on the disjunction of theism (with Humeanism or not) and some 
non-Humean view (with theism or not), say Spinozism. The actual world 
is regular, which is what we’d expect on the disjunction of theism and 
non-Humeanism but not at all on atheistic Humeanism. So, all else being 
equal, atheistic Humeanism is significantly less plausible than the disjunc-
tion of theism and non-Humeanism. This argument has obvious parallels 
to the fine-tuning arguments for God’s existence. Call it the coarse-tuning 
argument. The coarse-tuning argument has little to do with the inflexibility 
of life in the range of possible cosmological constants. Nor does it purport 
to show that God exists. It simply shows that the world’s regularity makes 
atheistic Humeanism highly implausible.
Since atheism and idealism are essential to the main contours of Yetter-
Chappell’s view, its future development might sit better with one or another 
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form of non-Humeanism. Perhaps the view could adopt a form of semi-
Humeanism according to which the tapestry is not a mind in any robust 
sense even though perceptions bear robust, necessary connections among 
themselves. But these necessary connections would be quite difficult to 
explain given that nothing more fundamental would serve to tie them to-
gether. Given the view’s idealism, no mind-independent spatial-temporal 
relations could tie them together. And given the view’s semi-Humeanism, 
no further underlying mental substance could tie them together either. A 
more promising pairing, in my view, would combine the tapestry with 
one of the idealistic interpretations of Spinoza’s metaphysics or one of the 
more well-known versions of absolute idealism. On the Spinozistic view, 
for example, the tapestry’s regularity wouldn’t be an absurd accident be-
cause reality couldn’t have been any other way. But reality would also lack 
an infinite mind with any sort of agency. So if divinity requires agency, 
Yetter-Chappell would have some reasonable grounds for labeling the re-
sulting view atheistic.
The essays I’ve highlighted above deserve further attention, of course, 
and I hope they continue to be read by those with interests in philosophy 
of religion. But the volume should also attract attention from philosophers 
with other interests. Readers will find excellent essays touching on top-
ics in contemporary metaphysics, Kant, philosophy of mind, philosophy 
of language, and the philosophy of science. Overall, the editors deserve 
praise for cultivating a volume that stands a good chance of leaving a posi-
tive and lasting mark on the discipline.
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A Grotesque in the Garden , by Hud Hudson. Xerxes Press, 2017. Pp. 150. 
$ 9.99 (paperback). (Available only through Amazon.)
MATTHEW A. BENTON, Seattle Pacific University
In philosophy the genre of first-person fictional narrative is rarely used. 
This is likely because the philosophical issues and arguments raised are 
typically not illuminated by being discussed by a character whose attitudes 
or personality can distract from rather than enhance the topic of interest. 
In addition, most philosophers, both presently and historically, are not 
skilled enough to portray a complex literary character entirely through the 
character’s own voice. Yet Hud Hudson’s A Grotesque in the Garden accom-
plishes a rare feat: it presents two main characters whose understanding of 
theism and its intellectual challenges are inextricable from their personal 
stories, including their emotional and spiritual shortcomings, and this 
powerful combination is engaging for both the seasoned philosopher and 
